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Introduction
The 2008-2009 crisis and the subsequent sharp rise in sovereign debts in most countries, are forcing governments to reform their public sectors. A particularly debated reform is to establish parity between work conditions in the private and the public sector. For instance, according to the lead article in The Economist, January 8 th 2011, "The struggle with public-sector unions should be about productivity and parity, not just spending cuts". It is thus useful to study the potential efficiency gains, but also the distributional conflicts, arising from such reforms.
It is commonly believed that employment in the public sector "differs" from employment in the private sector. Specifically, jobs in the public sector are far more secure and public employees receive a wide range of (monetary or in kind) benefits on top of their wages that are unrelated to work performance. 1 This is even if wage differentials between the private and the public sector have been reduced over time. It is natural to expect that such differences play a key role in work incentives and, hence, productive efficiency of the public sector relative to the private sector.
European Union countries provide a clear example. The standard deviation of employment in the public sector is smaller than the standard deviation of employment in the private sector (see Appendix 1) implying a higher degree of job security in the public sector. Besides, there is a lot of anecdotal evidence of extra benefits received by public employees (see e.g. Alesina, 1999, Alesina and Giavazzi, 2006 , The Economist, January 8 th 2011, while examples of "advantages of government employment" in various countries can be also found in a plethora of web links).
2
Finally, nowadays, in most EU countries, public employees enjoy on average higher wages than their counterpart workers in the private sector even after controlling for education, age, gender, etc (see e.g. de Castro et al., 2013) .
In this paper, we first construct a general equilibrium model that incorporates the above facts. In particular, we construct a modified neoclassical growth model that incorporates three distinct types of agents (capitalists, private workers and public 1 These benefits come in the form of better health insurance, higher pensions, more paid leave (sick, holiday, vacation, etc) , student loan repayments, overtime payments, child care subsidies, etc. Advantages of employment in the public sector may also come in the form of reduced working hours and a more relaxed work environment. 2 Munnell et al. (2011) estimate the value of extra benefits that state-local public sector employees enjoy in the US vis-à-vis their private sector counterparts.
employees) and two sectors (producing private and public goods). Capitalists and private workers are associated with the production of the private good, while public employees and goods purchased from the private sector are used by the government (i.e. by a state-owned enterprise) for the production of the public good. Private workers face job insecurity modeled as in the lotteries literature. When the model is solved numerically using common parameter values and European fiscal data, it can mimic rather well the advantages of employment in the public sector in the EU as discussed above.
In turn, departing from this status quo solution, we study the qualitative and quantitative implications of a number of reforms that aim to strengthen the incentive to work and, hence, improve productive efficiency (measured as an output-to-input ratio) in the public sector. As said, we focus on reforms that establish parity between work conditions in the public and the private sector. In particular, in light of the above empirical evidence, and similarly to the situation in the private sector, we introduce job insecurity in the public sector, link the public wage rate to a measure of labor productivity and change the mix between wages and transfers in favor of the former.
We study both the aggregate and distributional implications of these reforms.
Our main results are as follows. Introducing job insecurity, like in the private sector, seems to improve the work incentives of public employees but the importance of this reform is negligible quantitatively. Cutting public wages (for instance, by linking the public wage rate to a measure of labor productivity) deteriorates the work incentives of public employees and this leads to a drop in public output and to trivial effects on the rest of the economy. By contrast, what seems to really help the aggregate economy is a policy reform that equalizes the ratio of non-labor transfers to the wage rate in the two sectors and, at the same time, uses the efficiency savingsbeing enjoyed by the switch to a more efficient economy with a bigger tax base -to cut income taxes. The importance of the ratio of non-labor transfers to the wage rate for work incentives should not come as a surprise: Fang and Rogerson (2011) have already shown the importance of this ratio for hours of work.
Therefore, in our experiments, the main policy task should be to equalize the ratios of non-labor transfers to the wage rate across the public and the private sector.
But, as it usually happens with reforms, this does not come as a free lunch: although it is good for the aggregate economy (per capita private and public output, per capita welfare and public sector efficiency, they all rise), as well as for other social groups (the net income and welfare of capitalists and private workers rise), public employees are badly hurt relative to the status quo. Their work incentives are improved, but their net income and consumption level are damaged. These distributional consequences can possibly provide an explanation why public sector unions are negative to such reforms. As The Economist, January 8 th 2011 says, "the immediate battle will be over benefits, not pay, … and the real issue is parity".
Then, a natural question to ask is whether we can find a mix of reforms that, although they generate the above social benefits, they are more feasible politically in the sense that they protect the income of public employees. 3 We show that this can be partially achieved by combining the above mentioned key reform (namely, the equalization of the ratios of non-labor transfers to the wage rate in the two sectors)
with an income support policy that keeps the wage rate in the public sector above a minimum value. For instance, setting the wage rate in the public sector equal to the wage rate in the private sector, in combination with the above mentioned key reform, allows a rise in the net income and consumption levels of capitalists and private workers without hurting a lot the net income and consumption of public employees, which remain close to their status quo levels. Public employees get worse off in terms of utility, partially because of the lower consumption they enjoy relative to the status quo, but, mainly, because they have to work harder than in the status quo. On the negative side, this new mix of reforms comes at the cost of relatively smaller gains in aggregate productive efficiency, whereas public sector productive efficiency remains close to the status quo level.
The bottom line is that, although there are social options, at the end of the day, there is a value judgment to be made. It is hard to find Pareto efficient reforms. In other words, we cannot find a way of improving everything without making something else worse. As it happens in most cases, there is a tradeoff between efficiency and distribution. But, on the positive side, we can find policy mixes that mitigate the distributional costs. The problem, as Wren-Lewis (2010) points out, is that policy mixes are not well understood by the public and any mix of policies becomes an unproductive battle between the political Right and the political Left.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environment. Section 3 solves for the status quo economy. Reforms are studied in section 4. Section 5 closes the paper. An Appendix includes technical details.
Informal description of the model
Our vehicle of analysis is a modified neoclassical growth model of a closed economy.
The model comprises three social classes, called capitalists, private workers and public employees (for similar models, see e.g. Ardagna, 2007 , and Economides et al., 2013 . Time is discrete and infinite. The model is deterministic for simplicity.
Population shares and households' roles
The population size at time t is t N . Private workers work in the private sector facing a non-zero probability of losing their jobs. Public employees work in the public sector with probability one. For simplicity, only capitalists save in the form of capital or bonds. There are also f t N f ,..., 2 , 1  identical private firms owned by the capitalists. The number of capitalists equals the number of private firms or each firm is run by a capitalist. For simplicity, the fractions of the three agents in total population are exogenously set and remain constant over time. We also rule out occupational choice and mobility across groups. 
Production of private and public goods
Private goods are produced by private firms. These firms choose capital, supplied by capitalists, and labour services, supplied by both capitalists and private workers. They also make use of public infrastructure. Public goods are produced by the government.
To do so, the government purchases part of the private good produced and hires public employees. 5 Public goods and services provide utility-enhancing services to households and productivity-enhancing services to private firms. In order to finance its various types of public spending, the government levies distorting taxes and issues bonds.
How private and public workers differ and how we model job insecurity
Public and private employees can differ in wages, non-labor benefits received and job security. Regarding the degree of job security, in the status quo economy, we assume that only private workers face job insecurity. Then, in the reformed economy, one possible reform will be to allow for job insecurity in the public sector too.
To model job insecurity, we will use the employment lotteries model of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) and also used by e.g. Hansen and Prescott (1995) . Thus, agents face an exogenous employment lottery that determines whether or not they are employed. Although this is a rather stylized model of unemployment, it keeps the algebra simple and allows minimal deviations from both the associated market-clearing paradigm and the related literature on public employment. Details are in subsection 3.2 below.
The model (status quo economy)
This section formalizes the above story. As said above, in the status quo, only private workers face job insecurity.
Capitalists' problem
The lifetime utility of each capitalist ( 
acting competitively. The first-order conditions include the budget constraint in (3) and:
where (4a) is a labor supply condition, while (4b) and (4c) are standard Euler equations for capital and government bonds respectively.
Private workers' problem
As said above, private workers face employment uncertainty modeled as in the lotteries model of Hansen (1985) , Rogerson (1988) and Hansen and Prescott (1995) .
In particular, following this literature, we assume that each private worker Following the same literature, we also assume that the worker can insure himself/herself through optimally chosen private unemployment insurance. 6 The worker makes his/her decisions (including employment contracts) prior to the lottery draw.
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The lifetime utility of each private worker, e are w 's consumption and work effort respectively. For our numerical solutions below, we will again use: 6 We could alternatively assume that there is a representative family of workers whose members can be employed with probability  , or unemployed with probability 1   (see e.g. Cole and Ohanian, 2004 , for this device although in a different problem); the results would be the same. Also note that we could alternatively use private savings instead of private unemployment insurance; again, the main results would not change but the model is algebraically simpler if we assume that workers do not participate in asset markets. 
If the worker is employed, which happens with probability 1 0    , the budget constraint is:
, , We solve the problem working as in e.g. Rogerson (1988) and Hansen and Prescott (1995) . Thus, in each period, the private worker maximizes expected utility:
subject to the single expected budget constraint:
7 See e.g. Hassler et al. (2005) for a case in which private decisions are made after current uncertainty is realized. 8 Thus, we also allow for government unemployment insurance via a transfer program. A difference of government insurance from private insurance is that, while private contracts are privately optimally chosen, the government forces agents to be part of its transfer program by financing its spending by compulsory and general taxation. See also Hassler et al. (2005) for the coexistence of both private and public unemployment insurance in modern societies. We are aware of course that if private insurance markets are complete, then full risk sharing is achieved via these markers so that progressive taxation or government insurance provides no additional insurance gain (see Krueger and Perri, 2011 
Each w chooses 
where (10a) implies that private insurance allows consumption smoothing across different employment states, (10b) is a standard labor supply condition and (10c) equates costs and benefits of private insurance.
If we combine these first-order conditions, (10b) can be rewritten as: 
which implies that work effort decreases with ,
and  . That is, work effort, or hours of work, fall when transfers relative to net-of-tax labor income rise or when job security rises. Keep in mind that these are direct effects holding everything else constant. The overall, or general, equilibrium effects associated with changes in tax rates, etc, are studied below. All this is conceptually similar to Fang and Rogerson (2011) , although these authors focus on the effects of labor tax rate on work hours and also abstain from job insecurity issues.
Public employees' problem
Public employees are modeled similarly to private employees with the exception that (in the status quo economy) they do not face job insecurity. Thus, the lifetime utility of each e are b 's consumption and work effort respectively. For our numerical solutions below, we will again use:
subject to the budget constraint:
where g t w is the wage rate in the public sector and
, is government transfers to each public employee. 
which, using the budget constraint, can be rewritten as: 
where, for our numerical solutions below, we will use a production function of the form:
where , , 0 while here we also allow the public good to provide production services as in e.g. Barro (1990) . We report that none of these assumptions is important to our main results.
The firm's first-order conditions are simply:
so that profits are:
Government budget constraint and policy instruments
The period budget constraint of the government is (aggregate quantities are denoted by capital-letters): 
G
, will be set as in the data (see below for details).
Total tax revenues, t T , are:
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t T N c N c N c N rk N we h N w e h N weh
Therefore, as in e.g. Alesina et al. (2002) , we include the three main types of government spending (purchases of goods and services from the private sector, public wages, and transfers to individuals). We also include the three main types of taxes (taxes on consumption, capital income and labor income).
Inspection of (20a-b) implies that, in each time period, there are eleven policy
out of which one has to adjust residually to satisfy the government budget constraint. Following most of the related literature, we will assume that, along the transition path, the adjusting instrument is the end-of-period public debt, 1  t B , so that the rest can be set exogenously by the government. Instead, in the steady state, we will set the debt-tooutput ratio as in the data and allow the labor tax rate to be the residually determined instrument (see also e.g. Mendoza and Tesar, 2005, in Economides et al. (2013 Economides et al. ( , 2014 , we use a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:
is a technology parameter. Notice that both private and public good production face the same TFP; this is because we do not want our results to be driven by exogenous factors. The total cost of public production,
G w L  , is financed by the government through taxes and bonds (see the government budget constraint (20a) above).
Decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) of the status quo economy
Combining the above, we now solve for a DCE. This is for any feasible policy.  . This equilibrium system is presented in Appendix 5. It is solved numerically first for the steady state and then for its transition path when linearized around the steady state. In the steady state, the public debt to GDP ratio is set as in the data and the labour tax rate plays the role of the residually determined fiscal policy variable.
Numerical solution of the status quo economy
In this subsection, we provide a numerical solution of the above economy. We start with parameterization.
Parameter values and policy instruments
Since the nature of our numerical solutions is mainly illustrative, our parameterization is chosen in a simple fashion. Regarding parameters for technology and preferences, we use common values. Regarding policy variables, we use data averages of the Eurozone over 2000-2012 (the data source is Eurostat). These values are shown in Table 1 . The time unit is meant to be a year. We report that our main results are robust to changes in parameter values. In the private sector production function, the Cobb-Douglas exponents of labour and capital are set at 0.64 and 0.33 respectively, while the exponent of public capital is set at 0.03, which is close to the public infrastructure investment as share of output in the data (0.025). The TFP parameter, A , is normalized at 1. The time preference rate,  , is set at 0.99. The weight given to public goods and services in the utility function is set at 0.1, which is within the range used in the related literature. 10 The other preference parameters related to private consumption and leisure, 1  and 2  , are set at 0.3 and 0.6 respectively; these parameter values imply hours of work within usual ranges. The capital depreciation rate,  , is set at 0.05. In the public sector production function, the share of public employment vis-à-vis the share of goods purchased from the private sector, 1   , is set at 0.569. This value is the sample average of payments to public wages as a share of total public payments to inputs used in the production of (2013), we target the value of 1.03 for the ratio of the public wage rate to the private wage rate. This in turn implies an almost equal allocation of transfers between public and private agents (in particular, public employees receive 50.8% of total transfers).
Notice, however, that since public employees constitute only 21.5% of the working population, this means that they receive the lion's share of government transfers, as one would expect (see the Introduction). In turn, we exogenously allocate the remaining share of transfers (49.2%) going to the two private groups (namely, entrepreneurs and workers) according to their population shares as shown in Table 1. We report, however, that our main results are not sensitive to the specific value of the public wage premium used in the status quo economy. 
Steady state solution of the status quo economy
Given the parameter and policy values in Table 1 , the steady state solution of the status quo economy is reported in Table 2 (where the key variables are shown in bold). We also report that, when linearized around the steady state, the model is saddle-path stable. Table 2 is well defined and does relatively well at mimicking the GDP ratios of key macroeconomic aggregates like consumption and capital. More importantly, in this solution, private workers work harder but consume less than public employees. As a result, in terms of utility, public employees are better off than private workers, while it is the capitalists (or "the rich") that enjoy the highest utility level. We believe that all this is consistent with the common belief that, in most European countries, public employees are the winners in terms of wages, transfers and 11 In a previous version of the paper, we parameterized the model assuming that, in the status quo, the public wage rate was lower than the private wage rate (this is the case in the US and in a number of European countries); the qualitative effects of reforms do not depend on this. We also parameterized the model so as workers were indifferent (either in terms of steady state consumption or in terms of job security relative to their counterparts in the private sector (see the papers in the Introduction). In the context of our model, this can be rationalized by the implicit assumption that there is a ration of government jobs. It is also worth noticing that productive efficiency in the public sector is lower than in the private sector, where productive efficiency is typically measured as an output-to-input ratio (see Appendix 6 for details). 
Policy reforms
In this section, departing from the above steady state solution of the status quo economy, we study the implications of various exogenous changes in fiscal policy.
Motivated by the discussion in the Introduction, the aim is to study the effects of policy changes aiming at parity. As we saw in the theoretical model above, work effort in the public sector and work effort in the private sector can differ because of differences in the degree of job security, the wage rate earned and the amount of income that is being received as a transfer relative to the wage rate. Hence, we will study what happens when private workers and public employees are at par regarding the degree of job security, the manner the wage rate is determined and the ratio of non-labor transfers to the wage rate.
Policy reforms studied
The reforms studied are listed in Table 3 . To understand the logic of our results, and following usual practice, we start by experimenting with one reform at a time and only in turn study reform mixes. Table 3 around here Description of policy reforms In Reform no. 1, we add job insecurity in the public sector like in the private sector. Thus, now public employees know that can keep their job with a nonzero steady state utility) between working in the private sector or the public sector in the status quo economy. Again the qualitative effects of reforms do not depend on this. 12 See Afonso et al. (2005) and Angelopoulos et al. (2008) for computations of public sector efficiency in various countries and various policy areas. On the other hand, see Pestieau (2007) and Sørensen (2014) for a critical review and methodology issues. probability 0 1 q   only, like their counterparts do in the private sector (see subsection 4.2 below for modeling details). In particular, we set 0.9 q    , meaning that both private workers and public employees fear that there is a probability 10% of losing their jobs. Since we do not want the ex ante employed public employees to receive higher per capita wages simply because their number has been decreased, we also cut the exogenously set output share of public wages, w t s , by 10%.
Reform no. 2 postulates that the wage rate in the public sector is set in a manner similar to that in the private sector. Specifically, we assume that the wage rate in the public sector equals a measure of the marginal product of labor in this sector, Reform no. 4 is a mix of reforms that simply combines reforms 1, 2 and 3 together.
Reform no. 5 is like no. 4 with the exception that now the wage rate is assumed to be proportional to the wage rate in the private sector, where the degree of proportionality will be specified below. That is, instead of assuming (1 ) 
Adding job insecurity in the public sector and the new equilibrium system
In terms of modeling, the main new ingredient is to add job insecurity in the public sector. We thus now assume that both private workers and public employees face job uncertainty and make their decisions prior to the lottery draw. In what follows, we only model what changes relative to the status quo model in the previous section.
Public sector employees,
, are now modeled similarly to private workers. Thus, if we denote by 1 0   q the probability that a public employee keeps his/her job, while 0 1 1 q    is the probability of losing his/her job, then with probability 1 0   q , the budget constraint is:
while, with probability 0 1 1 q    , the budget constraint is:
where, as above, Thus, in each period, each public employee maximizes expected utility:
(1 )(1 ) 
If we combine these first-order conditions, the labor supply condition (25b) can be rewritten as:
which is like (11) above for the private worker and can give (16) as a special case.
The new DCE system, as well as the associated new market-clearing conditions, is presented in the Appendix (see Appendices 3 and 4).
Steady state solutions of the reformed economies
In this subsection, we provide steady state solutions under the reforms listed in Table   3 . The parameterization is as in Table 1 except that now 0.9 1
under each type of reform, is reported in Table 4 , where in the first column -for expositional convenience -we also repeat the status quo solution of Table 2 . Notice that some ratios remain unchanged across regimes; this happens because of the functional forms used in the numerical solution but it is not important to the main results. We start with Reform no. 1, as defined in Table 3 , and compare it to the status quo. On the positive side, Reform no. 1 improves work incentives ( b e rises) in the public sector and enhances private output. On the negative side, public output and per capita welfare all fall. But all these effects are marginal in magnitude (for instance, per capita output increases by less than 0.5%) so we are inclined to claim that the introduction of job insecurity in the public sector does not appear by itself to generate substantial social benefits.
Under Reform no. 2, as defined in Table 3 , work incentives in the public sector clearly deteriorate ( b e falls a lot) and this is damaging for public sector output.
This happens mainly because the resulting fall in wages in the public sector further damages the work incentive of public employees. Public sector efficiency rises (although public output decreases) but this happens only because public wages have fallen substantially. On the other hand, per capita output increases but again the change is quantitatively weak (less than 1%). Thus, as with job insecurity, the attempt to link public wages to productivity in the public sector cannot by itself lead to social benefits.
Reform no. 3, as defined in Table 3 , is different. Now, work incentives in the public sector clearly improve ( b e rises a lot) and, at same time, private output, public output and per capita utility all rise. In particular, private and public output increase by more than 4% and 30% respectively. The same applies to public sector efficiency which rises substantially vis-à-vis the status quo. Notice that a larger tax base allows a cut in the labour tax rate that further stimulates the aggregate economy. On the negative side, public employees get worse off; public wages and transfers allocated to public employees both fall, so their net income and consumption also fall.
Reform no. 4 (which is a combined mix of Reforms 1, 2 and 3) is like Reform no. 3 both qualitatively and quantitatively, indicating that the main results are driven by Reform no. 3.
Therefore, taking stock of results so far, the key reform is no. 3. It is thus good for the general interest to equalize the ratio of non-labor transfers to the wage rate in the two sectors,
, and, at the same time, to use the efficiency savingsenjoyed by the switch to a more efficient economy -to cut labor taxes. The latter creates a second round of social benefits. The problem, as it usually happens, is that this reform is not a free lunch: although per capita private and public output, public sector efficiency and per capita welfare all rise vis-à-vis the status quo, public employees get impoverished by the fall in their net income and get worse off relative to the status quo.
It is then natural to ask: is it possible to find a mix of policy reforms that are not only socially beneficial, but also do not hurt the net income and the consumption level of public employees? Since the above reforms were accompanied by a substantial fall in public wages that impoverished public employees, we now search for a mix that combines the key reform (Reform no. 3) with a policy that keeps the wage rate in the public sector above a minimum value. For instance, in Reform no. 5, we replace the condition (1 )
with the condition Gomes, 2014, also links public wages to private wages in a reformed economy). In all other aspects, Reform no. 5 is like Reform no. 4. Then, the results reported in the last column of Table 4 imply that, in this case, the increase in the net income and consumption of capitalists and private workers is not accompanied by a big decrease in the net income and consumption of public employees as it happened under Reforms 3 and 4. Public employees may be worse off in terms of utility relative to the status quo but since -by construction -they enjoy the same wage rate as their private counterparts,
w w  , the decrease in utility is mainly explained by the fact that they now work harder.
Private output, public output as well as per capita welfare all rise relative to the status quo, although now these rises are smaller than in Reforms 3 and 4. For instance, in Reform no. 5, private output increases by about 2.7%, which is smaller than the increase by more than 6% obtained in Reform no. 4. On the negative side, since now public wages are relatively high, public sector efficiency slightly falls relative to the status quo. This is unavoidable cost of social protection. In sum, we cannot avoid the standard tradeoff between efficiency and equity. A social value judgment has to be made.
Transition results as we travel to the reformed economy
We next study what happens when we depart from the pre-reform status quo economy and travel towards a new long-run of a reformed economy.
14 To save on space, we focus on the case in which the economy travels to the long-run equilibrium that corresponds to Reform no. 5, since the latter is a combination of all other reforms. Table 5 . Table 5 around here Discounted lifetime utility Inspection of Table 5 reveals that, as it was also the case when we compared steady state solutions, capitalists and private sector employees, as well as the aggregate economy, benefit from the adoption of Reform no. 5. On the other hand, this Reform again hurts those working in the public sector. The latter are now worse off relative to the pre-reform economy. In particular, the last column of Table 5 indicates that public sector employees should receive a consumption subsidy of 25% in order to be indifferent between the pre-reform and the reformed economy. On the other hand, capitalists, private sector employees and the overall economy enjoy a consumption benefit of 17%, 20% and 10% respectively from a switch to the reformed economy. Details on the calculation of these consumption equivalents, denoted as  in Table 5 , are in Appendix 7.
Conclusions, political economy issues and extensions
In this paper, we searched for policy reforms that can strengthen the incentive to work in the public sector. Using a general equilibrium setup with heterogeneous agents and a potential conflict of interests, we showed that the adoption of specific reforms -the main feature of which was the establishment of parity between employment conditions in the public sector and employment conditions in the private sectorstatus quo economy, we compute the equilibrium transition path of each reformed economy and in turn calculate the associated discounted lifetime utilities of the three types of households as well as the resulting per capita lifetime utility. These utilities are finally compared to their associated values if we had remained in the status quo economy forever. Recall that the model is deterministic so that the only source of transition dynamics is policy reforms.
improve work incentives in the public sector, as well as benefit the aggregate economy, but at the cost of making the existing public employees worse off. Typically, this happens through the political system. In the context of our model, even if public employees are few in number, they may have enough political power to block reforms. This means that our model could be extended to account for the (mutually beneficial) interaction between interest groups and policymakers at the top of the government hierarchy, and how this interaction ensures the preservation of the status quo. We leave these extensions for future work.
APPENDIX Appendix 1: Turnover in the public sector
The data source is Eurostat. Data are yearly and cover a maximum time span from 1996 to 2012. The countries included in the data set are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, UK, US and Japan. Employment in the public sector corresponds to the number of employees in public administration, defense, education, human health and social work activities. Employment in the private sector is computed as total employees minus employment in the public sector. Finally, turnover in the public sector is defined as the standard deviation of employment in the public sector relative to the standard deviation of employment in the private sector. A value of this ratio less than 1 implies that job insecurity in the public sector is lower than job insecurity in the private sector. 
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Appendix 3: The insurance company
The insurance company maximizes period-by-period profits by choosing a supply of unemployment insurance, denoted as I . Thus, it maximizes (1 )
w t     from the worker's optimization problem, the insurance company is at its break-even point.
Appendix 4: Market-clearing conditions
The equations below are the market-clearing conditions in the general case in which there is job uncertainty in both the private and the public sector. The market-clearing
Appendix 5: Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium
The system below summarizes the DCE in the general case in which there is job uncertainty in both the private and the public sector. 
1.031
PubSE / PrivSE 0.442 formula is used for all per capita quantities). 
